Competitive market equilibrium under asymmetric information |
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Authors: | Vathana Ly Vath |
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Affiliation: | 1.Laboratoire de Probabilités et Modèles Aléatoires CNRS, UMR 7599,Université Paris 7,Paris Cedex 05,France |
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Abstract: | This paper studies the existence of a competitive market equilibrium under asymmetric information. There are two agents involved in the trading of the risky assets: an “informed” trader and an “ordinary” trader. The market is competitive and the ordinary agent can infer the insider information from the price dynamics of the risky assets. The insider information is considered to be the total supply of the risky assets. The definition of market equilibrium is based on the law of supply-demand as described by a rational expectations equilibrium of the Grossman and Stiglitz (Am Econ Rev 70:393–408, 1980) model. We show that equilibrium can be attained by linear dynamics of an admissible price process of the risky assets for a given linear supply dynamics. |
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Keywords: | Insider trading Stochastic filtering theory Equilibrium Utility maximization |
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