首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


An Empirical Analysis of Bidding Fees in Name-your-own-price Auctions
Authors:Martin Bernhardt  Martin Spann
Institution:1. Kampmann, Berg & Partner, Schwanenwik 32, D-22087 Hamburg, Germany;2. Munich School of Management, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Abstract:Interactive pricing mechanisms integrate customers into the price-setting process by letting them submit bids. Name-your-own-price auctions are such an interactive pricing mechanism, where buyers' bids denote the final price of a product or service in case they surpass a secret threshold price set by the seller. If buyers are given the flexibility to bid repeatedly, they might try to incrementally bid up to the threshold. In this case, charging fees for the option to place additional bids could generate extra revenue and reduce incremental bidding behavior. Based on an economic model of consumer bidding behavior in name-your-own-price auctions and two empirical studies, we analytically and empirically investigate the effects bidding fees have on buyers' bidding behavior. Moreover, we analyze the impact of bidding fees on seller revenue and profit based on our empirical results.
Keywords:
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号