| 我国养老保险中的政企博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 宋旺,钟正生. 我国养老保险中的政企博弈分析[J]. 福建行政学院福建经济管理干部学院学报, 2004, 0(2): 45-49 |
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| 作者姓名： | 宋旺 钟正生 |
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| 作者单位： | 湘潭大学,商学院,湖南,湘潭,411105 |
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| 摘 要： | 我国现行养老保险制度面临着严重资金短缺的困境 ,通过政府和企业之间的两阶段完全信息动态博弈分析 ,揭示了这种现象的深层制度根源 ,并探讨改进政府和企业之间的低效率博弈均衡的途径 ,提出了几条相应的政策建议
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| 关 键 词： | 养老保险 博弈 子博弈纳什均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-584X(2004)02-0045-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-03-11 |
An analysis on the Government-enterprise game in the case of pension insurance |
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| by SONG Wang and ZHONG Zheng-sheng. An analysis on the Government-enterprise game in the case of pension insurance[J]. Journal of Fujian School of Administration and Fujian Institute of Economics and Management, 2004, 0(2): 45-49 |
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| Authors: | by SONG Wang and ZHONG Zheng-sheng |
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| Affiliation: | by SONG Wang and ZHONG Zheng-sheng |
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| Abstract: | The pension insurance system in China is encountering fund deficit problem. This paper attempts to explain the institutional background of the problem through a two-stage game analysis. The analysis is followed by some policy suggestions. |
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| Keywords: | pension insurance game sub-game Nash equilibrium |
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