Recruitment,Training, and Career Concerns |
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Authors: | Heski Bar‐Isaac Juan‐José Ganuza |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics Stern School of Business NYU, 44 West 4th Street New York, NY 10012 heski@nyu.edu;2. Department of Economics and Business Universitat Pompeu Fabra Jaume I, 2E82 Ramon Trias Fargas 25‐27, 08005‐Barcelona, Spain juanjo.ganuza@upf.edu |
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Abstract: | We examine training and recruitment policies in a two‐period model that nests two forms of production, “routine” work where ability and effort are substitutes and “creative” work where they are complements. Alternative ways of improving average ability have opposite implications for agents' career concerns. Although teaching to the top (training complementary to ability) or identifying star performers increases agents' career concerns, teaching to the bottom has the opposite effect. The paper also makes more general comments relating to models of reputation. |
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