On Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in a market for pure indivisibles without money |
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Institution: | 1. Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID), US;3. Carnegie Mellon University, US;4. Koç University, Turkey |
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Abstract: | This paper deals with the Walrasian property of Nash and strong equilibria of a specific strategic market game which refers to a pure exchange economy involving purely indivisible commodities and no money. The game is of sealed-bid auction type and it is shown that any Nash equilibrium at which no agent is in status quo is a strong equilibrium and implements a Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, it appears that two modifications of the game's rules ensure that any strong equilibrium outcome is Walrasian. These results are identical to those obtained by Svensson for markets involving purely indivisible goods and money. |
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