Job matching and the distribution of producer surplus |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Management and Technology and CRIOS, Bocconi University, Via Sarfatti 25, I-20136 Milan, Italy;2. Department of Architecture, Built Environment and Construction Engineering, Politecnico di Milano, Piazza Leonardo da Vinci 32, I-20133 Milan, Italy;1. Guangdong Province Engineering Research Center for Urban Water Recycling and Environmental Safety, Graduate School at Shenzhen, Tsinghua University, Shenzhen 518055, Guangdong, China;2. Kunming Dianchi Water Treatment CO. LTD, Kunming 650228, Yunnan, China;3. Department of Civil, Structural and Environmental Engineering, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland;1. Department of Management and Marketing, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland;2. Adelaide Business School, University of Adelaide, South Australia, Australia;3. School of Business, Waterford Institute of Technology, Waterford, Ireland |
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| Abstract: | We study wage determination in the Jovanovic model of matching, relaxing the standard assumption that wages continuously adjust to reflect on-the-job performance and studying aggregation of ex-ante heterogeneous career paths. We assume that workers have no bargaining power and consider an equilibrium where individual workers' age-earnings profiles are piecewise constant, reflecting their outside earning opportunities at each point in time. Turnover results from employers' firing decisions rather than from workers' quitting decisions, and the equilibrium delivers realistic cross-sectional and time-series implications. Employees receive only a portion rather than the whole of the ex-ante producer's surplus from established matches, and have individual incentives to lobby for increased job security. Inefficiently low aggregate turnover may result if such lobbying efforts are successful. |
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