Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline |
| |
Authors: | Vicent Calabuig Antoni Cunyat Gonzalo Olcina |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economic Analysis, University of Valencia, Campus dels Tarongers, Av/ dels Tarongers s/n. Edifici Departamental Oriental. 46022 Valencia, Spain (Gonzalo.Olcina@uv.es) , ES |
| |
Abstract: | This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition between the buyers. |
| |
Keywords: | JEL Classification: C78 D43 J52 |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|