Can regulation de-bias appraisers? |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Smeal College of Business, The Pennsylvania State University, 381 Business Building, University Park, PA 16802, USA;2. Department of Finance, National University of Singapore, Singapore;3. J. Mack Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, USA;1. University of Duisburg-Essen, Lotharstr. 65, 47057 Duisburg, Germany;2. Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration, Getulio Vargas Foundation, Rua Jornalista Orlando Dantas 30, 22231-010 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil;3. Braunschweig Institute of Technology, Abt-Jerusalem-Str. 7, 38106 Braunschweig, Germany;1. Department of Finance and Real Estate, Lindner College of Business, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221, United States;2. Fannie Mae, Washington, D.C. 20005, United States;3. Department of Economics, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506, United States;1. ALBA Graduate Business School, The American College of Greece, 6-8 Xenias Str, 11528 Athens, Greece;2. Bank of Greece, 21 E. Venizelos Ave., 10250 Athens, Greece;3. University of Piraeus, Department of Banking and Financial Management, 80 Karaoli & Dimitriou str., 18534 Piraeus, Greece;4. Surrey Business School, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom;1. Cass Business School, London, United Kingdom;2. CEPR, United Kingdom;3. Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland;1. Bank of Canada, 234 Wellington St, Ottawa, ON K1A 0G9, Canada;2. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, United Kingdom |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the effect of a regulatory action (the Home Valuation Code of Conduct) that was designed to reduce the incidence of inflated collateral valuations. We identify the impact of the regulation using a difference-in-difference identification strategy. Our baseline results confirm that the regulation reduced inflated valuations in refinance transactions by 16% in the large lender sample, compared to small lenders and a placebo sample. The effect is most significant in low-liquidity and low-distress markets, but not in other markets. We find that the regulation had a significant impact on loan to value ratio and interest rate, and it also led to a significant increase in defaults but a decrease in prepayments. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
