Welfare improving licensing with endogenous choice of prices versus quantities |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Tourism and Hospitality, TransWorld University, No. 1221, Zhennan Rd., Douliu City, Yunlin County 640, Taiwan;2. Department of Economics, Soochow University, No. 56, Kueiyang Street, Section 1, Taipei 100, Taiwan;1. Department of Business Administration, Fu Jen Catholic University, No. 510, Zhongzheng Rd., Xinzhuang Dist., New Taipei City 24205, Taiwan;2. Department of Business Administration, National Chin-Yi University of Technology, No. 57, Sec. 2, Zhongshan Rd., Taiping Dist., Taichung 41170, Taiwan;1. Département des sciences administratives, Université du Québec (Outaouais), Campus St. Jérôme, 5 rue St Joseph, St Jérôme, Québec J7Z 0B7, Canada;2. Université du Québec (Montréal), École des sciences de la gestion, 315 Ste.-Catherine est, R-2915, Montréal, Québec H2X 3X2, Canada;3. Chaire d’information financière et organisationnelle (Université du Québec à Montréal), and Université du Québec en Outaouais, Canada;1. Patrick E. Molony Professor, Department of Economics, Auburn University, 138 Miller Hall, Auburn, AL 36849, United States;2. Department of Economics, University of California Santa Cruz, 1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, United States;1. School of Humanities, Economics and Law, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Shaanxi, China;2. School of Economics and Finance, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China;3. School of Economics and Management, Xi’an University of Technology, Xi’an, China;4. Department of Marketing Management, Shih Chien University at Kaohsiung, Kaohsiung 845, Taiwan |
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| Abstract: | This paper investigates the endogenous choice of prices versus quantities by taking into account patent licensing where the patent holder, which is itself a producer within the industry, licenses its cost-reducing innovation to the rival firm through a two-part tariff contract. For substitute products we find that both Cournot and mixed price-quantity competition may constitute the equilibrium outcomes, depending on the innovation size. Contrary to the results in Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002), we show that the optimal licensing contract definitely leads to an increase in social welfare. Our result reinforces the positive welfare effect of patent licensing. |
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| Keywords: | Patent licensing Two-part tariff Cournot competition Bertrand competition Endogenous strategic variables |
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