Default and Renegotiation in Financial Distress in the Multiple Bank Model: An Analysis of the Main Bank System |
| |
Authors: | Hiroshi Osano |
| |
Affiliation: | Kyoto University |
| |
Abstract: | This paper explores whether the "main bank system" in Japan can be explained by a self-enforcing mechanism that motivates delegated monitorin g creditors to be committed not to execute inefficient liquidation even though all agents are risk-neutral. Using a multiple bank model, we specify a standard debt contract equilibrium in which the delegated monitoring creditor does not care about her reputation, and a main bank contract equilibrium in which the delegated monitoring creditor will attempt to honour the loan contract so as not to destroy her reputation. The results show that, under certain conditions, any equilibrium standard debt contract is dominated by an equilibrium main bank contract in which the debtor and the delegated monitoring creditor are strictly better off. Furthermore, the equilibrium main bank contract reflects the prominent features observed in actual bank loan contracts in Japan. JEL Classification Numbers: D82, G21, G33, G34 |
| |
Keywords: | |
|
|