Grazing Games: Sharing Common Property Resources with Complex Dynamics |
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Authors: | Anne-Sophie Crépin Therese Lindahl |
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Institution: | 1.The Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics,The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences,Stockholm,Sweden |
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Abstract: | Grasslands used for domestic livestock are often the common property of several owners and are typically characterized by
complex ecosystem dynamics. We account for both these aspects by modeling the problem as a differential game where each farmer
maximizes profits, given the dynamics of livestock and grass interaction. We compare the first best outcome obtained when
farmers cooperate with that for non-cooperative farmers. By accounting for grassland dynamics, we challenge conventional results
from the common pool literature. Although we do identify situations where the standard result holds—a tragedy of the commons
unless farmers cooperate—we also find examples where a tragedy is exacerbated due to ecosystem dynamics as well as cases where
a non-cooperative regime under-exploits the grassland compared to the first best outcome. |
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