The relative importance of campaign expenditures: An application of production theory

In an election campaign a politician attempts to combine the resources at his disposal so as to maximize the percent of the votes he receives. This behavior is consistent with an economic model of production where the producer combines inputs in order to maximize output. In this paper the concept of an election campaign as a production process is applied to elections to the U.S. House of Representatives. The three inputs were campaign expenditures, years of tenure in office, and the percent of registered voters in candidate's party. Cobb-Douglas and CES versions of the production function are estimated. Each estimation indicated that the marginal productivity of campaign expenditures was very low. Further, the CES estimation indicated low elasticity of substitution between campaign expenditures and other inputs. This means that it is difficult for a candidate who faces a disadvantage—either because his opponent is an incumbent with several years experience, or because he belongs to a minority party—to overcome this disadvantage by simply spending more money.