Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills |
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Authors: | Naoki Yoshihara |
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Affiliation: | The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Naka 2-1, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8603, Japan |
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Abstract: | In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, consistency w.r.t. technological innovations, so that the non-welfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solutions) from the viewpoint of responsibility and compensation discussed by Dworkin. |
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Keywords: | C71 C78 D63 D71 |
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