跨行政区流域水污染冲突机理分析:政府间博弈竞争的视角

流域的整体性与行政区分割的矛盾,使得不同行政区之间常常因为利益冲突而引起流域水污染纠纷,这已成为我国严重的环境问题。文章基于政府间博弈竞争的分析框架,分析中央和地方政府间博弈竞争、同级地方政府间博弈竞争在跨行政区流域水污染治理中的策略性行为,通过对双重博弈竞争模型均衡结果的研究,发现地方政府对辖区流域水污染治理的概率取决于中央政府的监管成本和处罚力度,而在缺乏有效监督和处罚的情况下,地方政府的"理性"选择是不治理,这种地方政府间的"囚徒困境"导致流域水污染越来越严重。因此,建立有效的激励和约束机制引导地方政府在流域水污染治理中采取合作行为,一要构建强有力的跨行政区的流域组织协调机构;二要建立科学的地方政府绩效评估体系;三要构建流域水污染治理生态补偿机制。

An Analysis on the Conflicts Relating to Transboundary Water Pollution： A Perspective of Games between Governments

Given the fact that a river basin is usually divided by more than one administrative district, disputes relating to water pollution control frequently spring among those districts, and to find a way to solve these conflicts has become a pressing social problem. This article, based on an analytical framework of inter-governmental competitive game, aims to reveal the competition between central and local governments, or those local governments at the same level. Through the research of the equilibrium of double game eompetitiort model, it also proved that the efficiency of a lo- cal government＇s water pollution control depends on the supervision and punishment of the central government. When the supervision and punish- ment from above is absent, the ＂rational＂ option for the local government would be abstaining its environmental responsibilities. It is this Prisoner＇s Dilemma that caused the deterioration of water pollution. Approaches to resolve this dilemma would he： firstly, to construct an effective trans- boundary water pollution coordination mechanism; secondly, to set up a scientific evaluation system of local governments; thirdly, to establish an eco-eompensation system.