Voting over selective immigration policies with immigration aversion |
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Authors: | Giuseppe Russo |
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Institution: | (1) Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, N-5035 Bergen-Sandviken, NORWAY;(2) Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, USA |
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Abstract: | Selective immigration policies set lower barriers to entry for skilled workers. However, simple economic intuition suggests
that skilled majorities should welcome unskilled immigrants and protect skilled natives. This paper studies the voting over
a selective policy in a two-country, three-factor model with skilled and unskilled labor, endogenous migration decisions,
costly border enforcement and aversion to immigration. Results show that heterogeneity in capital distribution forces skilled
voters to form a coalition with unskilled voters, who become pivotal. The voting outcome is therefore biased towards the preferences
of the latter, and consists in a selective protectionism. Finally, immigration aversion helps to explain why skilled majorities do not bring down entry barriers against unskilled
workers. |
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Keywords: | |
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