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Market structure,common ownership,and coordinated manager compensation
Authors:Werner Neus  Manfred Stadler  Maximiliane Unsorg
Institution:School of Business and Economics, University of Tübingen, Nauklerstr. 47, Tübingen, Germany
Abstract:We study oligopolistic competition in product markets where the firms' quantity decisions are delegated to managers. Some firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds, whereas the other firms are owned by independent shareholders. Under such an asymmetric ownership structure, the common owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing the manager compensation schemes. This implicit collusion induces a less aggressive output behavior by the coordinated firms and a more aggressive behavior by the noncoordinated firms. The profits of the noncoordinated firms are increasing in the number of coordinated firms. The profits of the coordinated firms exceed the profits without coordination if at least 80% of the firms are commonly owned.
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