First-price auctions where one of the bidders’ valuations is common knowledge |
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Authors: | Irene Martínez-Pardina |
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Affiliation: | (1) Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Murcia, Campus de Espinardo, 30100 Espinardo, Murcia, Spain |
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Abstract: | We analyze a private and independent valuation first-price auction under the assumption that one of the bidders’ valuations is common knowledge. We show that no pure strategy equilibrium exists and we characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the bidder whose valuation is common knowledge randomizes her bid while the other bidders play pure strategies. In an example with the uniform distribution, we compare the expected profits of seller and buyers in this auction with those in a standard symmetric private valuation model. |
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Keywords: | Asymmetric first-price auction |
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