| 风险企业财务治理研究：组织结构视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 王宗萍,邹湘江,张淑慧.风险企业财务治理研究：组织结构视角[J].河南金融管理干部学院学报,2009,27(2):118-121. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王宗萍 邹湘江 张淑慧 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆工商大学,重庆,400067 |
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| 摘 要： | 风险投资企业因所有权与经营权没有完全分离，形成了“非完全委托代理”关系，这种特殊的委托代理关系导致风险企业形成高层组织与执行层组织相互交叉的组织结构。在此前提下，风险企业财权组织结构安排必须将财务决策权、财务控制权和财务监督权等实现合理配置。
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| 关 键 词： | 风险企业 财务治理 组织结构 非完全委托代理 |
Study on Venture Enterprise Financial Governance:A Perspective of Organizational Structure |
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| WANG Zong-ping,ZOU Xiang-jiang,Zhang Shu-hui.Study on Venture Enterprise Financial Governance:A Perspective of Organizational Structure[J].Journal of Henan College of Financial Management Cadres,2009,27(2):118-121. |
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| Authors: | WANG Zong-ping ZOU Xiang-jiang Zhang Shu-hui |
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| Institution: | WANG Zong- ping,ZOU Xiang-jiang, Zhang Shu- hui (Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China ) |
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| Abstract: | In complete separation between ownership and management of venture capital enterprises forms a ＂non - fully principal - agent＂ relationship. This special agency relationship results in the formation of venture enterprises with the implementation of high - level cross - layer organizational structure. On this premise, the organizational structure of venture arrangements for property rights must satisty a reasonable allocation between the financial decision -making power, financial control and financial supervision, etc. |
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| Keywords: | venture enterprises financial governance organizational structure non - fully principal - agent |
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