股东、政府及管理层之间的委托代理分析

传统意义上的委托代理理论是指单重委托代理理论，主要用来分析以私有产权和私有制为基础的公司制企业在经营权和所有权分离的背景下产生的公司治理问题。但在我国，国有企业从初始委托人（全体人民）到最终代理人（管理层）存在着多层的委托代理关系，企业内所有者缺位，所有权的监督比较薄弱，因此单重委托代理理论不适合用来分析我国的国有企业。运用双重委托代理理论对我国国有企业中的股东（全体人民）、政府及管理层之间的委托代理关系进行了分析而得到双重委托代理理论比单重委托代理理论更具解释力的结论。对委托代理模型的主要变量进行了讨论，并给出全民和政府分别作为委托人时的最优激励合同、政府侵占全民的租金及双重委托代理的总代理成本。

Principal-Agent Relationships between the Shareholders, Government and Management

The traditional principal-agent theory refers to the unit principal-agent theory,which is mainly applied to the corporate governance in the private companies with the separation of ownership and management.However,in China,there exist multiple principal-agent relationships in state-owned enterprises.Absence of owners and the lack of supervision result in the non-efficiency of the application of the theory.This paper applies the dual principal-agent theory to the analysis of relationships in state-owned enterprises,which is much more proper in explaining their relationships.At last,a qualitative analysis on the main variables is employed to find the optimal incentive contracts for the principals,people and the government,the optimal rents tunneled by the government and the total principal-agent costs.