Consumer confusion,obfuscation and price regulation |
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Authors: | Yiquan Gu Tobias Wenzel |
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Institution: | 1. University of Liverpool;2. University of Bath;3. Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) |
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Abstract: | This paper studies firms’ obfuscation choices in a duopoly setting where two firms differ in their marginal costs of production. We show that the high‐cost firm chooses maximum obfuscation while the low‐cost firm chooses minimal (maximal) obfuscation if the cost advantage is large (small). We argue that in this setting there is a new role for price regulation as it leads to more transparent pricing. Moreover, a price cap benefits social welfare as it shifts production to the more efficient low‐cost firm. |
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