Optimal new-product pricing in regulated industries |
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Authors: | Gerald R. Faulhaber James Boyd |
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Affiliation: | (1) University of Pennsylvania, USA |
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Abstract: | Intertemporal pricing issues faced by regulated monopolists in market settings characterized by high rates of innovation have received little attention in the regulatory economics literature. Most analyses of regulatory pricing have focused on monopolies characterized by a stable multiple-good product set. In a regulated industry characterized by technological change in the form of new products and services (such as telecommunications), optimal pricing decisions may also reflect intertemporal market and production factors. In this paper, two such intertemporal factors are modeled: learning curve effects on the firm's cost function, and customer demonstration effects on the demand side of the market. Inclusion of these factors leads to an intertemporal pricing rule that may conflict with the standard regulatory practice whereby each product or service must recoup its own resource costs period by period. Our results suggest that this regulatory practice can result in efficiency losses, since it results in a rate of technological diffusion that is too low. |
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