Corporate Governance and Performance in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of REITs |
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| Authors: | Robert D Campbell Chinmoy Ghosh Milena Petrova C F Sirmans |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Finance, 134 Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY 11549-1333, USA;(2) Department of Finance, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269, USA;(3) Department of Finance, Whitman School of Management, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244, USA;(4) Department of Risk Management/Insurance, Real Estate and Business Law, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA |
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| Abstract: | We examine 132 mergers and acquisitions by Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) during 1997–2006 and explore the relationship
between acquirer external and internal corporate governance mechanisms and announcement abnormal returns. We argue that in
regulated industries with absent active takeover market, the importance of outside governance mechanisms is diminished and
substituted by internal governance controls. We focus on the REIT industry. We find that bidder returns are higher for REITs
with smaller boards, with more experienced CEOs, but with shorter tenure. Acquirers’ announcement returns are also significantly
and positively related to higher ownership by their CEOs and board directors. We find no significant relationship between
presence of staggered board and abnormal bidder returns, which supports our hypothesis that anti-takeover defense measures
have reduced importance for REITs. |
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