| 国企高管薪酬管制的经济学分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 赵纯祥. 国企高管薪酬管制的经济学分析[J]. 广西财经学院学报, 2011, 24(2): 109-112 |
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| 作者姓名： | 赵纯祥 |
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| 作者单位： | 中南财经政法大学,会计学院,湖北,武汉,430073 |
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| 基金项目： | 2009年中央高校基本业务科研项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 国企高管薪酬问题的根源在于内部治理机制失效、国有企业资源租金阻碍了业绩的可证实性、高管薪酬信息披露机制不健全和股东利益法律保护机制缺乏威慑力等方面。充分发挥职工董事在高管薪酬形成机制中的作用、完善高管薪酬信息披露制度、降低质疑高管薪酬问题的门槛和积极推进国企高管业绩评价手段是解决高管薪酬异化的有效措施。
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| 关 键 词： | 国有企业 高管薪酬 管理者权力 职工董事 企业管理 信息披露 |
Economic Analysis of Controling Executive Compensation of State-Owned Enterprises |
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| ZHAO Chun-xiang. Economic Analysis of Controling Executive Compensation of State-Owned Enterprises[J]. JOURNAL OF GUANGXI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, 2011, 24(2): 109-112 |
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| Authors: | ZHAO Chun-xiang |
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| Affiliation: | ZHAO Chun-xiang(School of Accountancy,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073,China) |
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| Abstract: | The root of this problem came from various aspects,such as inefficiency of internal governance system,block of performance verifiability,unsound information disclosure system and deficient deterrent force of law protection system for shareholders’ benefit.The effective measures to settle the alienation of executive compensation include: give full play to the role of worker directors in the formation mechanism of executive compensation,improve the information disclosure system of excutive compensation,lower the threshold of questioning the issue of executive compensation,promote the performance evaluation of executives and so on. |
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| Keywords: | state-owned enterprise executive compensation administrator power worker director business management information disclosure |
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