Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion |
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| Authors: | Jérôme Mathis |
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| Institution: | Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ), University of Toulouse, Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile J.J. Laffont, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France |
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| Abstract: | We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on both players' preferences and information that can be certified for a Sender-Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winter's D.J. Seidmann, E. Winter, Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages, Econometrica 65 (1997) 163-170] results to games with partial provability. |
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| Keywords: | C72 D82 |
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