土地双垄断情况下的收益博弈

本文通过重复信号博弈模型和双垄断模型,运用制度分析法来考察现有土地制度安排下地方政府和中央政府对土地利用的最优反应,结果显示:(1)中央政府对地方政府的监管成本过高,导致土地垄断利润分配过程中地方政府获利更大,进而催生了《土地管理法》;(2)现有地方土地资源利用完全不受限制,导致地方经济发展失去了中央宏观调控的约束。因此,本文提出相关对策建议。

Land Income Game of Dual Monopoly of Land

Through the repeated Signaling game model and duopoly market model,this paper evaluates the best responses of both the local and central government to the use of land resources under the current land institutional arrangements.We get two conclusions.On one hand,the regulatory costs of central government are too high,so that the local government gets the large portion of land monopoly profits in the allocation process.It is also the main reason of enacting Article 47,55 of Land Management Law and other regulations.On the other hand,due to the use of local land resources is completely unrestricted,macroeconomic regulation and control of the central government are seems ineffective.Finally,we present four policy proposals,namely,to accelerate the pace of development of collective ownership enterprises,to increase the subsidies for land acquisition,to open the secondary market of land,and to establish a new set of governing performance evaluation mechanism by taking the differences between east and west into consideration.