First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model |
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Authors: | J. Philipp Reiß Jens Robert Schöndube |
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Affiliation: | (1) Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands;(2) Economics Department, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | We analyze first-price equilibrium bidding behavior of capacity-constrained firms in a sequence of two procurement auctions. In the model, firms with a cost advantage in completing the project auctioned off at the end of the sequence may enter the unfavored first auction hoping to lose it. Equilibrium bidding in both auctions deviates from the standard Symmetric Independent Private Value auction model due to opportunity costs of bidding created by possibly employed capacity. For this sequential auction model with non-identical objects, we show that revenue equivalence applies. |
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