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Adverse selection in group insurance: The virtues of failing to represent voters
Authors:Robin Hanson
Affiliation:(1) Department of Economics, George Mason University, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030, MSN 1D3, USA
Abstract:Compared with non-union workers, union workers take more of their compensation in the form of insurance. This may be because unions choose democratically, and democratic choice mitigates adverse selection in group insurance. Relative to individually-purchased insurance, we show that group insurance chosen by an ideal profit-maximizing employer can be worse for every employee, while group insurance chosen democratically can be much better. The reason is that democracy can fail to represent the preferences of almost half the group.Received: January 2003, Accepted: September 2004, JEL Classification: J51, D82, G22
Keywords:Union  compensation  democracy
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