Power and efficiency in production pillage games |
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Authors: | J S Jordan |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, 514 Kern Building, University Park, PA 16802, USA |
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Abstract: | A pillage game is a formal model of Hobbesian anarchy as a coalitional game. The technology of pillage is specified by a power
function that determines the power of each coalition as a function of its members and their wealth. A coalition can despoil
any other coalition less powerful than itself. The present paper studies the problem of achieving an efficient allocation
of resources when the required reallocation changes the distribution of power. For example, land redistribution may increase
total production, but may also deprive the original owners of the power they need to compel compensation. In this case the
original owners would block the redistribution. Previous work on pillage games has focused on the stable set (von Neumann–Morgenstern
solution) as a representation of a stable balance of power. However, the balance of power is typically too delicate to support
all efficient allocations. The present paper shows that for a large class of power functions, a recently developed extension
of the stable set, called the legitimate set, can be rich enough to support all efficient allocations.
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Keywords: | Conflict Efficiency Coalitional game Pillage Core Stable set Legitimacy |
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