Strategic Rivalry With Spillovers Within Segmented Versus Integrated Markets |
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Authors: | Geert Steurs |
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Institution: | 1000 Brussel and Department of Applied Economics , Katholieke Universiteit Leuven , School of Economics, Sint Aloysius, Stormstraat 2, Leuven, 3000, BelgiumNaamsestraat 69 |
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Abstract: | We consider a two-stage game with firms investing in R&D in the first stage while competing a] la Cournot in the second stage. The firms are located in two countries, which are either segmented or integrated. R&D spillovers occur between firms located in the same country as well as between firms located in different countries. We first examine the consequences of market integration on the impact of national and international R&D spillovers on innovative efforts, effective R&D, profits and total welfare. Comparing the resulting equilibrium levels, we subsequently conclude that market integration always leads to higher R&D investments and output if international R&D spillovers are limited, while the welfare consequences are ambiguous. Finally, we also analyze the welfare maximization problem of a ‘constrained social planner who can only decide on the level of R&D spillovers. |
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Keywords: | R& D spillovers Market Integration Patent Policy JEL Codes: f15 031 034 |
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