上市公司偏好、政府策略选择与会计信息失真均衡

上市公司会计信息失真可分为治理性失真、竞争性失真和干预性失真三大类.模型均衡表明,寡占博弈下的竞争性失真由真假会计信息市场信息产品边际净收益决定,与干预性、企业性因素无关,而干预性失真则由政府干预策略选择、干预强度、企业偏好和会计信息产品边际净收益等企业性、市场性和干预性三大因素决定.三大因素不对称地影响上市公司和市场的会计信息均衡,并通过改变干预性失真均衡而改变上市公司和市场会计信息绝对和相对均衡,以调节上市公司和市场的会计信息质量.实际市场信息失真主要是竞争性失真和干预性失真叠加的结果.

Preference of Corporation, Government's Strategy Choices and the Equilibrium of Real - False Accounting Information

There are three types of false accounting information.called governing, competitive and interfering false information in the stock market. In this article, the writer analyzes mainly competitive and interfering false accounting information. The model provided by this paper shows that the marginal net revenues of the real and false accounting information production are only decisive factors of the competitive equilibrium in the oligopoly accounting information market, having nothing to do with governing and interfering factors, but the governing equilibrium of accounting information is decided by the firm, market and interfering factors such as strategy choice of government, interfering power, preferences of the corporation and marginal production net revenues. The three factors influence the accounting information equilibrium differently with changing governing equilibrium to disturb the abstract and relative information equilibrium of the market and the oligopoly listed firms and further to change information quality.