Ökonomische Analyse der Regulierung von Sicherungseinrichtungen

In 2003, the German insurance industry faced the first life insurer insolvency for nearly 75 years. Although the crisis was overcome by transferring the insurance contracts to ‘Protektor’, a guarantee institution based on the industry’s self-regulation, the German government set off a judicial initiative on insurance guarantee schemes. However, a thorough economic analysis shows that the underlying rationale for this regulation fails to prove its efficiency — while the same goes for the soundness of the analogy to German deposit insurance structures. In contrast, the economic theory of regulation provides a profound explanation of legislative activity on the one hand, and emphasizes the danger of political misjudgement on the other. Considering the danger of political pretence of knowledge, a prioritization of market-driven solutions (self-regulation) is recommended, while keeping government regulation of insurance guarantee schemes to a minimum.