The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games |
| |
| Authors: | Francesc Llerena Carles Rafels |
| |
| Affiliation: | aDepartment of Business Administration, Rovira i Virgili University, Spain;bDepartment of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics, University of Barcelona, Spain;cCREB |
| |
| Abstract: | We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of a specific class of the convex games: the almost positive games. These games have non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above result we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition. |
| |
| Keywords: | Cooperative games Convex games Almost positive games Modular games Zero-monotonic games Lattice |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
