Job search,unemployment and savings

This paper examines optimal search policies on the basis of two alternative assumptions, first that individuals consume income as it is received, and second, that individuals can save and subsequently draw from their savings. In this model workers search for heterogeneousjobs, which are characterized by fixed wages and random duration of employment spells. Workers choose jobs which will maximize the total expected lifetime utility of consumption. The optimal steady-state job acceptance policy in both cases takes the form of a fixed partition of the set of all job offers into acceptable and unacceptable ones. In the absence of a capital market, employment duration appears to be irrelevant for the marginal job offer and all jobs offering wages which exceed the marginal one are also acceptable independent of the distribution functions of employment duration. Nevertheless, the dispersion of employment duration at inframarginal acceptable jobs affects job choice. It is shown that when individuals can save, and if current utility and probability density functions are exponential, then steady-state rates of saving during periods of employment, and of dissaving during periods of unemployment, are independent of wealth and constant. The model developed is then used to examine the determinants of unemployment and the properties of optimal savings rates, and to obtain a number of testable hypotheses about savings behavior and job security.