Bargaining over an uncertain outcome:¶the role of beliefs |
| |
| Authors: | Antoine Billot Alain Chateauneuf Itzhak Gilboa Jean-Marc Tallon |
| |
| Institution: | 1.CERAS-ENPC, Université Paris II and Institut Universitaire de France?e-mail: billot@u-paris2.fr,FR;2.CERMSEM, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne?e-mail: chateaun@univ-paris1.fr,FR;3.Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Recanati School of Business?e-mail: igilboa@post.tau.ac.il,IL;4.EUREQua, CNRS, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne and Università di Venezia?e-mail: jmtallon@univ-paris1.fr,FR |
| |
| Abstract: | We study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumptions
of risk neutrality and of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that the solution varies, ex ante, when we vary
the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent's beliefs in a way that makes them “more distant” from the other agent's beliefs
makes the second agent better off.
Received: 10 May 2001 / Accepted: 22 August 2001 |
| |
| Keywords: | Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 91A12 91B26 |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
