| 环境产权问题的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 李瑞娥,李春米. 环境产权问题的博弈分析[J]. 广西经济管理干部学院学报, 2003, 15(3): 23-26 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李瑞娥 李春米 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西,西安,710061 |
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| 摘 要： | 环境产权是最广泛意义的公有产权,在环境产权的行使中,各行为主体的个体经济目标和环境目标常常存在极大的差异,运用博弈理论阐述环境产权行使中的纳什均衡,旨在说明环境资源保护的社会意义。
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| 关 键 词： | 环境产权 博弈 环境保护 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-8806(2003)03-0023-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002-07-17 |
Game Analysis of Environment Proprietary Rights |
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| LI Rui-e,LI Chun-mi. Game Analysis of Environment Proprietary Rights[J]. The Journal of Guangxi Economic Management Cadre College, 2003, 15(3): 23-26 |
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| Authors: | LI Rui-e LI Chun-mi |
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| Abstract: | Environment proprietary rights are public ones with the widest significance. In the exercise of environment proprietary nights, individual economic targets and environment goals of behavioral subjects are extremely different. Applying the game theory, the paper discusses Nash ' s equilibrium in the exercise of environment proprietary rights, pointing out the social significance of environment protection. |
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| Keywords: | environment proprietary rights game environment protection |
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