差错责任追究制度与分析师盈余预测

本文分别从分析师跟踪、盈余预测误差和分歧度三个方面考察年报信息披露重大差错责任追究制度对分析师行为的影响。研究发现,建立差错责任追究制度公司的分析师跟踪人数更多、盈余预测误差和分歧度更低,并且这种关系主要存在于高管为男性以及盈余质量较差的公司。进一步研究发现,建立差错责任追究制度的公司盈余信息含量更高、分析师更可能发布现金流预测。研究结论表明,差错责任追究制度改善了公司信息披露环境。本文不但丰富了分析师盈余预测影响因素领域的研究,同时对上市公司强化内部治理以及相关部门的监管均具有重要启示。

Accountability for Major Errors System and Analysts’Earnings Forecast

This paper examines the impact on the accountability system’s behavior for major errors in information disclosure in annual reports.The paper employs three aspects to measure analysts’behavior:the number of analysts following the firm,analyst’s earnings forecast error,and forecast divergence.The results show that firms with the accountability for errors system have more analysts following them,whose earnings forecast errors and forecast divergence are also lower.This pattern mainly exists in firms with male executives and low quality of earnings.The paper also finds that the accountability for errors system makes the firm’s earnings more informative;thus,analysts are more likely to forecast accurate cash flow.This paper demonstrates that the accountability for errors system improves the information environment.It contributes to the literature by enriching the related research on the analysts’forecast of earnings and providing empirical implications for firms to strengthen internal governance and improve relevant departments’supervision.