Bargaining games with a random sequence of who makes the offers |
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| Institution: | 1. Centura Health Physicians Group, Colorado Breast Imaging, Avista Hospital, Department of Radiology, Louisville, Colorado;2. Department of Radiology, Mallinckrodt Institute of Radiology, St. Louis, Missouri;3. Department of Radiology, University of California Irvine, Orange, California;4. Department of Radiology, Temple University Hospital, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;1. KU Leuven, Forensic Biomedical Sciences, Department of Imaging and Pathology, Leuven, Belgium;2. KU Leuven, Laboratory of Socioecology and Social Evolution, Department of Biology, Leuven, Belgium;3. KU Leuven, Centre of Sociological Research (CESO), Faculty of Social Sciences, Leuven, Belgium;1. Faculty of Economics, Komazawa University, 1-23-1 Komazawa, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo 154-8525, Japan;2. Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan;3. Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo 186-8601, Japan;4. Department of Economics, Otaru University of Commerce, Hokkaido 047-8501, Japan;1. Institut Català de Paleontologia Miquel Crusafont, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici ICP, Campus de la UAB s/n, 08193 Cerdanyola del Vallès, Barcelona, Spain;2. Dipartimento di Scienze della Terra, Università degli Studi di Torino, Via Valperga Caluso 35, 10125 Torino, Italy;3. Department of Anatomical Sciences, Stony Brook University School of Medicine, Stony Brook, NY 11794-8081, USA;4. NYCEP Morphometrics Group, USA;5. ICREA at Institut Català de Paleontologia Miquel Crusafont, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici ICP, Campus de la UAB s/n, 08193 Cerdanyola del Vallès, Barcelona, Spain |
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| Abstract: | This note relaxes the rigid assumption in recent bargaining theory of a strictly alternating sequence of offers, and instead considers the opposite extreme: at each bargaining round a random event determines who gets to make an offer, irrespective of who made the previous offer. The equilibrium of this game is practically identical to the equilibrium of the alternating offers game if the horizon is infinite. With a finite horizon the properties of the equilibrium are more satisfying than the properties of the equilibrium of the alternating offers game. |
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