An analysis of non-insurance work incentives |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Mechanical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Ikole-Ekiti Campus, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, P.M.B. 373, Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria;2. Department of Electrical/Electronics Engineering, Federal University of Agriculture, PMB. 2240, Abeokuta, Nigeria;3. Department of Mechatronics Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Ikole-Ekiti Campus, Federal University Oye-Ekiti, P.M.B. 373, Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria;1. Institut für Theoretische Physik und Interdisziplinäres Zentrum für Molekulare Materialien, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (FAU), Staudtstrasse 7/B2, 91058 Erlangen, Germany;2. Department of Chemistry, University of Durham, South Road, Durham DH1 3LE, UK |
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| Abstract: | The paper analyzes work incentives which may be competitive, individualistic, or collective and where the firm does not insure worker income. Although competitive schemes reduce shirking, the collective scheme is shown to be optimal for sufficiently small workgroups. |
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