Teams,repeated tasks,and implicit incentives |
| |
Institution: | 1. Finance Department, Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, Steinberg Hall/Dietrich Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6367, USA;2. National Bureau of Economic Research, USA;3. Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, Campus Box 1133, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA |
| |
Abstract: | In a team setting, wherein only group performance is tracked, we show that muted incentive contracts may be sufficient to motivate team members. By having the team repeat a task, explicit (contractual) incentives can be substituted by implicit incentives team members provide to each other. We also study an example in which, despite uncorrelated individual performance measures being available, it is optimal to condition each manager's pay on both managers' performance. This can be viewed as creating a group performance measure. Using a group performance measure provides each manager with incentives to monitor and a means of punishing other managers. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|