行为委托-代理激励新模型及分析框架

标准委托-代理激励模型及分析框架沿袭新古典经济学中关于理性经济人、偏好不变、预期效用等基本假定，存在一些无法解释的现象和悖论。本文从行为经济学对主流经济学的新古典经济学基本假设的挑战出发，对标准委托-代理激励模型及分析框架中代理人完全理性和风险规避等基本假设所带来的缺陷进行了系统分析，探究了如何利用期望理论的价值函数替代期望效用函数、有限理性替代完全理性来构建新的委托一代理激励模型及分析框架。新模型和框架考虑了代理人的心理特征和非理性行为，将增强激励模型及分析框架对现实制度的解释力和适用性。

The Constructure of Behavioral Principal-agent Incentive Model and Frame

Following the basic hypnosis of rational individual, invariable preference and prospect utility theory, so there are many interpretative phenomena and paradox which standard principal-agent incentive model can not explain. The paper analyses the essential limitation of complete rationality and risk aversion hypnosis in standard principal-agent incentive model and analytical frame based on the challenge of behavioral economics on the basis hypnosis of newly classical economics, and point outs how to make use of the value function substituting for prospect utility function and bounded rationality substituting for complete rationality to reconstruct the principal-agent incentive model and analytical frame. The behavioral principal-agent incentive model and analytical frame which consider psychological characteristic and nonrational behavior of agent will improve interpretative power and adaptability of incentive model and frame accounting for realistic system.