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The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications
Authors:Franz Dietrich
Affiliation:a Maastricht University, Department of Quantitative Economics, Tongersestraat 53, 6211 LM Maastricht, Netherlands
b London School of Economics, CPNSS, Lakatos Building, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
Abstract:The new field of judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like “if a then b” are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic.
Keywords:D70   D71   D79
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