Self-admissible sets |
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Authors: | Adam Brandenburger Amanda Friedenberg |
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Affiliation: | a Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West Fourth Street, New York, NY 10012, United States b W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, United States |
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Abstract: | Best-response sets (Pearce, 1984 [28]) characterize the epistemic condition of “rationality and common belief of rationality.” When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler, 2008 [17]) characterizes “rationality and common assumption of rationality.” We analyze the behavior of SAS's in some games of interest—Centipede, the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chain Store. We then establish some general properties of SAS's, including a characterization in perfect-information games. |
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Keywords: | C72 D80 |
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