A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring |
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Authors: | Bo Chen |
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Institution: | Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, 3300 Dyer Street Suite 301, Umphrey Lee Center, Dallas, TX 75275-0496, United States |
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Abstract: | This paper extends the belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring. We first find that the previous belief-based techniques T. Sekiguchi, Efficiency in repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, J. Econ. Theory 76 (1997) 345-361; V. Bhaskar, I. Obara, Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 40-69] cannot succeed when players' private monitoring technologies are sufficiently different. We then modify the previous belief-based approach by letting the player with smaller observation errors always randomize between cooperate and defect along the cooperative path of the play. We show that with vanishing observation errors, efficiency and a folk theorem can be approximated using our modified belief-based strategies. |
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Keywords: | C72 C73 D82 |
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