Risk and Market Segmentation in Financial Intermediaries' Returns

This study examines both the quantity and price of risk exposure for different segments of financial intermediaries. Overall, we find evidence of market segmentation in the U.S. financial services industry. Specifically, we find that securities firms, consistently over the sampling period 1974–1994, had the most market risk exposure with the lowest market risk premium. Banks' market risk fluctuated over the sampling period. Banks increased their market risk-taking after the shift in monetary target in October 1979 and the announcement of the risk-based capital requirements in July 1988. The banks' market risk became the highest and insignificantly different from securities firms'. The results are consistent with the moral hazard argument; that is, banks took on more risk to take advantage of government guarantees as their charter value declined. Banks were subject to relatively high interest rate risk premium. However, in response to increased interest rate volatility and decreased charter value after October 1979, banks (while they increased their market risk exposure) lowered their interest rate risk exposure to an insignificant level. The results suggest that the federal safety net may have been perceived by the market as covering only market risk but not interest rate risk. Overall, we find little evidence of interest rate risk exposure, suggesting the prevalence of hedging programs using interest rate derivatives. The interest rate risk premiums, unlike the risk exposure, differ across financial intermediaries.