Constitutions for Local Collective Action and Institutional Interdependence |
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Authors: | Stefano Solari |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Padua, Via del Santo, 33, 35123 Padova, Italy |
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Abstract: | Collective action can take place at a plurality of levels. It has to be based on a constitution which defines the basic rules of interaction. Here, we are concerned with the problem of the constitutional setting of bottom-up formal institutions with a club nature. The pressure to improve the efficiency of services pushes local administrations to co-ordinate to produce public goods. This process has stimulated the birth of different forms of agencies or private companies with a club nature. The aim of this paper is to discuss the effects of institutional interdependence on the efficiency of this kind of collective action. In order to shed some light on this problem, the paper first discusses the problem of the relativity of efficiency to the institutional setting. A framework of analysis is then discussed to identify the main factors affecting collective action. Finally some evidence will be provided by a comparative institutional analysis performed on some case studies concerning local associational forms among communes in north-eastern Italy. |
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Keywords: | D71 H10 H73 functional federalism collective action institutional interaction |
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