| Abstract: | We develop an economic model of crime and search that allowsus to analyze the effects of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionaryrule on crime and privacy. We find that the rule always increasescrime but has two opposing effects on searches. It directlyreduces searches by reducing the chances that they lead to successfulconviction, but it also indirectly increases them by increasingcrime. If its indirect effect dominates, the rule actually increasessearches and has an ambiguous effect on wrongful searches. Ifits direct effect dominates, it reduces wrongful searches, therebyprotecting privacy. Its direct effect is more likely to dominatethe greater is the number of police officers per capita, thelower is the police's incentive to simply close cases and themore accountable the police are for their mistakes. Police accountabilityalso increases crime but unambiguously reduces wrongful searches.We also explore the effects of long-term progress in searchtechnology on crime and privacy. |
