Defensive acquisitions in the banking industry: The takeover premium hypothesis |
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Authors: | Babu G Baradwaj David A Dubofsky Donald R Fraser |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Finance, University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire, Wisconsin 2. Department of Finance, Texas A&M University, 77843, College Station, TX
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Abstract: | We define defensive acquisitions as takeovers made by a firm so as to become so large that it becomes an unattractive target itself. A sample of defensive acquisitions in the banking industry is used to test the takeover premium hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, the defensive acquirers lose because a takeover premium that previously existed in their prices is deflated while the takeover premium increases for smaller competitors because they become more likely targets. We find that the defensive acquirers experience significant negative abnormal returns on the announcement day, and that smaller competitors have positive abnormal returns on the announcements of defensive acquisitions. In contrast, larger competitors do not react to the announcements. The results are consistent with the takeover premium hypothesis. |
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