| 企业采用新技术的时点博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 叶佳,王鹏,罗虞宇. 企业采用新技术的时点博弈分析[J]. 技术经济与管理研究, 2007, 155(6): 26-27 |
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| 作者姓名： | 叶佳 王鹏 罗虞宇 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆师范大学,经济管理学院,重庆,400047;重庆师范大学,数学与计算机学院,重庆,400047 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社科基金项目(04CJY012) |
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| 摘 要： | 技术创新可以为企业带来超额利润，具有极大的经济价值，然而新技术的不确定性和风险性又使得企业不会立即采用。本文通过构建双寡头垄断博弈模型对企业采用新技术的时点进行研究，证明企业采用新技术时存在一个最佳时点，在这个最佳时点之前，企业应采取等待策略。
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| 关 键 词： | 采用新技术 采用时点 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-292X(2007)06-0026-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-08-12 |
Title Adoption of new technology on timing anylasis:a game approach |
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| YE Jia,WANG Peng,LUO Yu-yu. Title Adoption of new technology on timing anylasis:a game approach[J]. Technoeconomics & Management Research, 2007, 155(6): 26-27 |
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| Authors: | YE Jia WANG Peng LUO Yu-yu |
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| Abstract: | Though technology innovation that is capable of bringing the company superprofit,has great economic value.The company will not adopt it immediately because of its uncertainty and risks.so whether to adopt the new technology is in be in a dilem ma for a company.The key to solve this problem is when to adopt this new technology.So the problem of adopting new tech nology become that of a company selecting the optimal time.This paper does the researches on the adopting the time of the new technology by duopolies game model and has proved there is a optimal time of adopting the newtechnology,and before which the company should adopt waiting strategy. |
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| Keywords: | adoption of the new technology timing of adoption game theory |
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