高考录取机制的博弈分析

本文分析了高考招生中考后知分报考录取机制下的志愿填报博弈。完全信息时这个显示偏好博弈只有唯一的纳什均衡结果,均衡是帕累托有效和公平的。但是,真实的偏好并不一定是每个考生的均衡策略,达到均衡结果需要参与人之间的协调。使用文献中的Gale-Shapley学生最优机制,真实偏好是学生的优势策略,结果也是帕累托有效、公平的。本文介绍的录取机制,对于高考录取制度的改革提供了一种可行的思路。

A GAME-THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CHINA''S COLLEGE ADMISSION MECHANISM

The College admission mechanism in China is a giant revealing preference game played by millions of students every year. Unfortunately, the true preferences of students are not their optimal equilibrium strategies. We prove that the equilibrium outcome is unique and Pareto efficient, but it is hardly a possible mission for students to coordinate to equilibrium. Fortunately, the admirable Gale-Shapley model of deferred-acceptance mechanism in college admission can be adapted to achieve the same outcome with ...