ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS |
| |
Authors: | Shurojit Chatterji Jordi Massó |
| |
Institution: | 1. Singapore Management University, Singapore;2. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, SpainWe would like to thank Huaxia Zeng for helpful discussions and detailed comments, Salvador Barberà for insightful comments, and Masaki Aoyagi and three referees of the journal for very helpful and constructive comments. Chatterji would like to acknowledge research support from SMU grant number C244/MSS13E001 and thank KIER, Kyoto University for its hospitality. Massó would like to acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through Grant ECO2014‐53051 and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV‐2015‐0563), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through the research Grant SGR2014‐515. Please address correspondence to: Jordi Massó, Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica, Edifici B, UAB Campus, 08193 Cerdanyola del Vallès (Bellaterra), Spain. E‐mail: . |
| |
Abstract: | We consider strategy‐proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops‐onlyness, anonymity, and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single‐peakedness (referred to as semilattice single‐peakedness). We do so by deriving from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single‐peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well‐known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy‐proof rules are admissible are semilattice single‐peaked domains. |
| |
Keywords: | |
|
|